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I. INTRODUCTION

The 2015 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(FRCP) were an attempt to control excessive discovery. Faced with
increasing amounts of discovery in some cases, especially electronically
stored information (ESI), the rules now beg litigants and judges to do
* Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. I thank seminar participants at Emory
University School of Law and George Washington University Law School for helpful comments.
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better. One of the main changes to discovery is the new language in Rule
1 that makes it clear that the litigants, not just the judge, have the
responsibility to behave in a way that leads to just, speedy, and
inexpensive litigation. 1 The other main discovery-related change is that
Rule 26 now states explicitly that the amount of discovery should be
“proportional to the needs of the case.” 2
These changes are meek and ineffectual. As to the changes in Rule
1, before the change, it was already clear that securing the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of a case was the responsibility of both
judge and litigant. Indeed, it is impossible to think of anyone else whose
responsibility it might have been. As to the changes to Rule 26, since
2000, Rule 26 already had made clear that proportionality was required. 3
All that the 2015 amendment did was to move the proportionality
requirement to a different part of Rule 26, and make it even more explicit.
These changes have done little to control excess discovery. As we will
see, excessive discovery is a deep, fundamental flaw. The 2015
amendments are utterly insufficient to cure it. They are like placing a band
aid on the arm of a person with lung cancer; they will do nothing to cure
the illness.
Broad discovery harms the litigation process like a cancer.4 The
discovery provisions in the 1938 FRCP, and thereafter in most states’
procedural codes, were a grand experiment. But the last seven decades
have shown that, even by the FRCP’s own standards, they are a failure.
They have not led to the “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action,” as Rule 1 promised. 5 Instead, discovery is avoided in most
cases and ruins many of the rest. Most litigants choose to make their cases
discovery-free, finding the process unnecessary, unhelpful, and even
harmful.
In contrast, broad discovery has transformed the most important
cases: those with the most at stake, addressing society’s most crucial
issues and involving the best, highest-paid lawyers. These cases now last

1. Rule 1 now provides that “[t]hese rules . . . should be construed, administered, and
employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action and proceeding.” FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (emphasis added).
2. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
3. The earlier version of the rules prohibited discovery if “the burden or expense of the
proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit,” requiring that discovery be proportional, but not
using that word. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (2014).
4. Much commentary in this Article is based on the author’s earlier work in George B.
Shepherd, Failed Experiment: Twombly, Iqbal, and Why Broad Pretrial Discovery Should Be Further
Eliminated, 49 IND. L. REV. 465 (2016).
5. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
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longer and cost more to litigate. They settle less, requiring more trials and
consuming more judicial resources. 6
And the harms that discovery causes have become more acute as
discovery of ESI has become more important. For example, with a single
document request, a litigant can force an adversary to produce millions of
pages of the adversary’s electronically-stored private information. 7
There is no reason to conclude that all of this time and expense leads
to more justice. Discovery is a powerful weapon for imposing expense
and difficulty on an adversary. Plaintiffs and defendants with frivolous
cases often use discovery, or the threat of it, to coerce settlements.
Defendants escape liability by imposing oppressive, intrusive discovery
requests.
The discovery process has made many lawyers wealthy. Because
cases last longer and settle less, more lawyers are needed. Each additional
dollar of cost that discovery imposes on litigants is another dollar for a
lawyer.
However, broad discovery has otherwise deeply harmed the practice
of law. Elite lawyers now devote themselves almost completely to
discovery and other motions based upon it, such as summary judgment
motions. This work, although lucrative, is often boring drudgery.
Moreover, the use of broad discovery caused the profession to switch from
fixed-fee billing to hourly billing. 8 As this author has explored elsewhere,
the switch has harmed the legal profession deeply.
Discovery is against human nature, and it violates norms of privacy.
People in the United States expect privacy, especially from their
government. Indeed, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution have been interpreted as creating certain rights to privacy.
The government may not intrude into a citizen’s private decisions about
contraception, abortion, or homosexual sex. 9 And yet the FRCP permit a
government agency—the courts—and a government official—the
judge—to intrude into a citizen’s most private matters merely because the
citizen has sued or been sued.

6. See infra Section II(F)(1).
7. Martha J. Dawson & Bree Kelly, The Next Generation: Upgrading Proportionality for a
New Paradigm, DEF. COUNS. J. 434, 437-38 (2015) (noting that Microsoft reports the average amount
of pages of discovery documents involved in the average case was more than 59 million).
8. See George B. Shepherd & Morgan Cloud, Time and Money: Discovery Leads to Hourly
Billing, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 91 (1999).
9. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), which all interpret the 14th Amendment to create a right to
privacy surrounding these activities.
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Because broad discovery is against human nature, litigants who
receive discovery requests resist them compulsively. This leads to endless
cycles of evasions and motions to compel. Broad discovery is like
prohibition. Citizens tend to like both privacy and alcohol. Any attempt to
intrude on either privacy or drinking leads to resistance and unhappiness.
Because it violated ingrained human preferences, prohibition was a
failure. For similar reasons, so too is broad discovery.
Broad discovery should be eliminated. It is a failure and has been so
ever since it began in 1938. The rest of the world recognizes this; no other
country has copied the United States’ approach. 10 Moreover, almost from
the start, discovery’s flaws have been recognized, with bar committees,
scholars, and courts pointing out discovery’s harmful effects and
proposing changes. 11 Some of the most recent criticism of discovery came
from the Supreme Court through its decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly 12 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal. 13 Likewise, the 2015 FRCP amendments
made further adjustments. However, they achieved little improvement.
Although the diagnosis has been correct, the modest treatments that
have been continually implemented have achieved little. The correct cure
is simple. Broad discovery is a disease that should be eliminated
completely.
Both the legal profession and society at large would be better off
without broad discovery. The cost of litigation would decline
substantially. Cases would settle more frequently and quicker. Parties
would no longer be able to use discovery as a weapon to achieve unfair
results. Fewer frivolous suits would result in lucrative settlements.
Corporate defendants would no longer be able to stonewall by asserting
large, intrusive discovery requests.
Although many lawyers might lose their jobs as litigation becomes
quicker and easier, the displaced lawyers would be free to pursue careers
that contribute more to society’s well-being.

10. See Karin Retzer & Michael Miller, Mind the Gap: U.S. Discovery Demands versus EU
Data Protection, Privacy & Security Law Report, 10 PRIVACY & SEC. L. REP. 886 (2011),
http://media.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/110601-US-Discovery-Demands-versus-EU-DataProtection.pdf [http://perma.cc/D8D8-H54E] (noting Europe, in particular, takes a skeptical view of
the U.S. discovery process, as a direct challenge to individual privacy; the European Union adopted
the European Privacy Directive and several European states adopted “blocking statutes” with the
specific goal of limiting the reach of discovery requests from U.S. courts).
11. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635 (1989); Gordon
W. Netzorg & Tobin D. Kern, Proportional Discovery: Making It the Norm, Rather than the
Exception, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 513 (2010).
12. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
13. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
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The elimination of broad discovery is not a risky, fringe proposal.
Instead, the current U.S. system is the extreme outlier. Eliminating broad
discovery would return the United States to the mainstream with almost
every other country. As in other countries, discovery should be strictly
limited and allowed only in exceptional circumstances.14
The Supreme Court has recently expressed similar concerns about
the discovery process and, even more importantly, has eliminated
discovery in some cases. 15 The decisions in Twombly and Iqbal nominally
addressed issues of pleading. 16 However, like the analysis in this Article,
their focus was on the harms of the discovery process. 17 Moreover, just as
this Article proposes, the decisions eliminate discovery in some cases; the
decisions require early dismissal of certain cases that might otherwise lead
to broad discovery.
The proposal in this Article safely builds on the Twombly and Iqbal
decisions by proposing elimination of broad discovery in all cases, rather
than just some. The decisions moved in the right direction, but did not go
far enough. Instead, broad discovery should be eliminated completely.
This Article proceeds as follows. Section II discusses the history of
discovery and its many harmful impacts. Section II also discusses
attempts over many decades to fix the system by tinkering with the
discovery rules, as well as making changes judicially, as in Twombly and
Iqbal, and in the 2015 FRCP amendments. Section III describes how
eliminating broad discovery would provide many benefits and little harm.
II. AN EXPERIMENT FAILS FROM THE BEGINNING
The discovery provisions of the FRCP created a new experimental
system that had not been tried anywhere else. The new discovery rules
transformed the practice of law. However, almost immediately, critics
began to note the system’s basic flaws. A wide array of fixes have been
proposed and adopted. 18 However, these fixes have not worked.
Discovery still imposes many harms.

14. See Mathias Reimann, Liability for Defective Products at the Beginning of the TwentyFirst Century: Emergence of a Worldwide Standard?, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 751, 764 (2003).
15. See, e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662; Twombly, 550 U.S. 544.
16. See, e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662; Twombly, 550 U.S. 544.
17. See, e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662; Twombly, 550 U.S. 544.
18. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 11; Netzorg & Kern, supra note 11.
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New System

The drafters of the discovery provisions of the FRCP knew that their
new system was revolutionary and unprecedented.19 Although some state
courts offered isolated discovery opportunities, no state combined them
together as did the FRCP. Moreover, many of the state provisions that did
exist could not take effect because courts held that federal provisions with
no discovery occupied the field, precluding application of the state
provisions. 20
The new federal discovery rules were a complete list of all discovery
devices that were available in any state and in Great Britain.21 The
methods now include: required initial disclosures, 22 depositions by oral
examination, 23 depositions by written questions, 24 interrogatories, 25
production of documents and things, 26 medical examinations, 27 and
requests for admission. 28
The approach was revolutionary not only because of the number of
discovery devices that were now available, but also because of how easily
the devices could be invoked. At the same time, the rules that permitted
the discovery devices also permitted what is called “notice pleading.” 29 A
plaintiff could file a complaint, survive a motion to dismiss, and be
permitted to use the discovery devices by providing a complaint that
offered merely “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” 30 Later courts interpreted this to mean that
the complaint could include only the simplest conclusory summary of the
plaintiff’s differences with the defendants, and needed to include few, if
any, facts. 31 Accordingly, a plaintiff can commence a case with few, or
19. See Richard L. Marcus, Retooling American Discovery for the Twenty-First Century:
Toward a New World Order?, 7 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 153, 158-59 (1999) (noting that the new
discovery provisions were genuinely unprecedented); Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions
Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 734,
736 (1998) (describing the 1938 “discovery revolution”).
20. Marcus, supra note 19, at 159; Subrin, supra note 19, at 698-701.
21. Marcus, supra note 19, at 159; Subrin, supra note 19, at 718-19.
22. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1).
23. FED. R. CIV. P. 30.
24. FED. R. CIV. P. 31.
25. FED. R. CIV. P. 33.
26. FED. R. CIV. P. 34.
27. FED. R. CIV. P. 35.
28. FED. R. CIV. P. 36.
29. Pleading, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A system of defining and
narrowing the issues in a lawsuit whereby the parties file formal documents alleging their respective
positions.”).
30. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
31. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
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no, facts in hand and instead attempt to gather facts during the discovery
process.
The framers knew that their approach was unprecedented. 32
Moreover, they knew that such broad discovery created dangerous risks
of abuse. 33 However, as the chief reporter for the FRCP, Charles Clark,
later noted, the chairman of the Advisory Committee on these provisions,
Edson Sunderland, “had developed both the enthusiasm and the drive of
a crusader” to have the discovery provisions adopted. 34 Indeed,
Sunderland had for years argued in print that broad discovery should be
permitted. 35 Accordingly, in public hearings on the provisions, the
committee did not focus on the provisions’ revolutionary nature, instead
suggesting that the changes were merely incremental.36
Later courts recognized the new rules’ revolutionary nature. For
example, in the famous Hickman v. Taylor case, the Third Circuit noted
in 1945 that “[t]he rules probably go further than any State practice.” 37
Similarly, the FRCP’s chief reporter noted, in 1959: “The system thus
envisaged . . . had no counterpart at the time [Edson Sunderland]
proposed it.” 38
B.

The New Discovery Rules and the Transformation of Litigation

Before 1938, federal courts denounced any attempt to require
disclosure of the adversary’s case or evidence as improper “fishing
expeditions.” 39 By 1946, the new FRCP’s discovery rules had converted
these attitudes completely. In the appeal of Hickman v. Taylor, the
Supreme Court stated: “No longer can the time-honored cry of ‘fishing
expedition’ serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts
underlying his or her opponent’s case. Mutual knowledge of all the
relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation.” 40
The new provisions for wide-open discovery created both
opportunities and incentives. First, the new rules greatly expanded

32. Marcus, supra note 19, at 160; Subrin, supra note 19, at 734, 736.
33. Marcus, supra note 19, at 160; Subrin, supra note 19, at 719.
34. Charles E. Clark, Edson Sunderland and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 58 MICH.
L. REV. 6, 9 (1959).
35. See generally Edson R. Sunderland, Scope and Method of Discovery Before Trial, 42 YALE
L.J. 863 (1933).
36. Marcus, supra note 19, at 160; Subrin, supra note 19, at 725-26.
37. Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 1945), aff’d, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
38. Clark, supra note 34, at 11.
39. See Carpenter v. Winn, 331 U.S. 533, 540 (1911).
40. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
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litigants’ opportunities to obtain information from their adversaries. 41
Second, the new rules created an incentive for lawyers to use discovery,
not only to obtain useful information, but also to gain tactical advantage
by imposing large discovery costs on their adversaries. Conducting
discovery became expensive, both for the party who sought discovery and
for the party who responded to the discovery request. 42
As lawyers exploited the new opportunities for broad discovery, the
discovery process transformed the practice of law.43 Maurice Rosenberg,
one of the leading experts on the FRCP and litigation procedure, has noted
that “[n]o change in litigation practice resulting from the Rules has had as
great an impact as the liberalization of pretrial discovery.” 44 Although
some cases had little discovery, in a substantial fraction of cases, the use
of discovery quickly exploded and, as Rosenberg has noted, discovery
“expanded from a useful tool to a combination lawyer’s industry and
litigator’s religion.” 45 Before 1938, lawyers who conducted lawsuits were
called “trial lawyers.” After the growth of discovery shifted the focus from
trial to expanded pretrial proceedings, trial lawyers began to be called
“litigators.” 46 For most, “trial lawyer” was no longer an accurate title.
Even in the small minority of cases in which trials occurred, 47 the trials
were now often preceded by long periods of intense pretrial
maneuvering. 48
Broad discovery’s impact on the profession grew greater as state
after state began to copy the new federal system, 49 and as lawyers
gradually began to adjust their professional behavior to the new discovery
environment. 50 Even after a jurisdiction adopted wide-open discovery, it
could take years for lawyers to learn to exploit fully the opportunities that
discovery offered both to obtain information and to seek strategic
advantage.

41. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26-37.
42. See George B. Shepherd, A Theoretical Model of the Pretrial Litigation Process and
Discovery (Sept. 16, 1998) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
43. See generally Maurice Rosenberg, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Action: Assessing
Their Impact, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2197 (1989).
44. Id. at 2203.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See WILLIAM A. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 97-98
(Russell Sage Found. 1968).
48. See Rosenberg, supra note 43, at 2203-04.
49. See Shepherd, supra note 4, at 469.
50. Charles W. Sorenson, Jr., Disclosure Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)—’Much
Ado About Nothing?,’ 46 HASTINGS L.J. 679, 695-96 (1995).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol51/iss3/8

8

Shepherd: Superficial 2015 Amendments

2017]

C.

SUPERFICIAL 2015 AMENDMENTS

825

Continual Tinkering with a Flawed System

Almost immediately after 1938, lawyers and commentators began to
note the new system’s flaws. 51 Initially, the focus was on how broad
discovery in federal and state litigation caused litigation costs to grow
quickly. 52 Discovery costs soon began to consume more than one-third of
the average case’s litigation costs. 53 In the decade after 1938, testimony
before Congress and a cascade of articles criticized the new discovery
rules. 54
Among other concerns, a frequent complaint was discovery’s great
expense. 55 For example, in 1951, an official for the federal courts wrote:
Today, after thirteen years of experience under liberal discovery rules,
complaints are heard. It is said: (1) That discovery is expensive and time
consuming out of proportion to benefits; that depositions last weeks,
interrogatories and admissions cover thousands of items, and motions to
produce call for tons of documents. 56

Similarly, the report from an extensive 1954 investigation concluded:
[T]he average practitioner, in addition to being saddled with such
overhead expenses as rising costs of office rents and clerical help, must
cope with increased court costs, filing fees and lengthy pre-trial
examinations . . . which are generally required in all negligence actions,
regardless of the nature of the injury or the amount of the probable
recovery. 57

Cost increases that resulted from wide-open discovery were not
limited to increases in pretrial costs. In addition, discovery both reduced

51. For a list of some of the early articles that criticized discovery, see William H. Speck, The
Use of Discovery in United States District Courts, 60 YALE L.J. 1132, 1133 n.3 (1951).
52. See id. at 1132.
53. See GLASER, supra note 47, at 179.
54. See Speck, supra note 51, at 1133 n.3.
55. Id. at 1132.
56. Id. Another survey described lawyers’ common complaints about discovery, one of which
was, “[l]itigation is more expensive and takes more time than formerly, because of the great amount
of work and documentation introduced by discovery.” GLASER, supra note 47, at 36.
57. Louis P. Contiguglia & Cornelius E. Sorapure, Jr., Lawyer’s Tightrope—Use and Abuse of
Fees, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 683, 701 (1956). Likewise, a 1957 article in the ABA Journal on the new
pretrial discovery rules noted:
Even though the Rules specifically provide protective measures against abuse,
embarrassment and undue annoyance, nevertheless not only our own observations but the
reported cases demonstrate the terrific time, expense and effort which can be, and are to a
significant extent, the results of the procedure outlined in these Rules.
Clyde A. Armstrong, The Use of Pretrial and Discovery Rules: Expedition and Economy in Federal
Civil Cases, 43 AM. B. ASS’N J. 693, 694 (1957).
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the frequency of settlement and caused trial costs other than discovery to
increase. 58 The drafters of the FRCP had predicted that, although
discovery would impose some additional cost before trial, total costs
would decline because discovery would cause more cases to settle.59
The prediction was wrong. Both earlier and recent studies
demonstrate that discovery did not produce a higher proportion of
settlements than would occur without discovery. 60 Instead, at the same
time that discovery increased pretrial costs, it decreased the settlement
rate, caused trials to become longer, and failed to reduce surprise at trial. 61
Scholars have developed various theories about why discovery deters
settlement, including the explanation that discovery appears to create
more disagreements than it resolves. 62 Moreover, it appears that once
litigants have spent large amounts on discovery, litigants have
psychological difficulty in letting go and settling, even when it is in their
financial interest to do so. 63
Whatever the reasons, the bar recognized that discovery caused total
litigation costs to increase. 64 The following conclusion from a 1951
American Bar Association (ABA) survey was typical:
Discovery does not appear to have been successful in speeding the
disposition of cases, for instead the courts seem to have taken over a
larger share of the burden of investigation. A comparison between cases
with and without discovery in Chicago and Maryland disclosed that
discovery is associated both with the cases which take longer to dispose
of and with cases which more often go to trial. 65

58. See GLASER, supra note 47 at 97-98, 101, 107; see also Rosenberg, supra note 43, at 2204;
Speck, supra note 51, at 1152, 1155; Maurice Rosenberg, Changes Ahead in Fed. Pretrial Discovery,
45 F.R.D. 479, 489 (1968). For a review of various empirical studies, see Sorenson, supra note 50, at
706-10 (1995).
59. See GLASER, supra note 47 at 9-12; Rosenberg, supra note 43, at 2204-05.
60. See sources cited supra note 58.
61. See sources cited supra note 58.
62. A survey of discovery practice concluded: “Discovery gives the attacking party more
confidence in raising his price for a settlement, but this often has the unintended effect of carrying the
case closer to trial.” GLASER, supra note 47, at 97. Glaser concluded that discovery leads to new
disagreements between the litigants, rather than resolving disagreements. See id. at 91-101; see also
generally Rosenberg, supra note 43, at 2204 (arguing discovery raises more new factual issues than
it resolves); Shepherd, supra note 42 (noting the discovery rules establish incentives that induce a
litigation arms race and deter settlement).
63. Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Unintended Consequences of Mandatory
Disclosure, 73 TEX. L. REV. 753, 753 (1995) (recognizing discovery increases pretrial expenses and
psychological studies indicate that people decline to settle after they have incurred great expense).
64. See Speck, supra note 51, at 1154-55.
65. Id. at 1155.
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Likewise, a lawyer from Indiana compared practice in federal court
with practice in state court, where discovery was prohibited, and noted,
“[o]ur office files for federal cases are from two to three times as thick as
those for comparable cases in state courts . . . .” 66 Addressing the
problems “of the tremendous expense, effort and time which can be
required of parties involved in litigation,” a law firm partner from
Pittsburgh wrote in the ABA Journal in 1957 that “it seems clearly evident
that in many respects the procedure provided for in the Rules has
aggravated rather than alleviated them.” 67 A decade later, a survey
indicated that discovery costs made up 19%-36% of litigation costs. 68
The new wide-open discovery substantially increased costs in
another way: by increasing uncertainty. 69 After broad discovery was
introduced, a lawyer was much less certain about the time and expense
that a case would require to litigate. 70 Such uncertainty is a real cost.
Indeed, the insurance industry is based on people’s willingness to pay to
eliminate such risk.
Although discovery caused litigation costs to increase greatly in
some cases, it caused little increase in others. 71 Large average discovery
costs hid wide variation in discovery costs in individual cases. 72 A survey
in 1951 noted many complaints “[t]hat discovery is expensive and time
consuming.” 73 However, the survey also noted the wide variation in
discovery amounts. Some cases had voluminous discovery, but some had
little. 74 Indeed, both this 1951 survey and another survey from the same
year noted that no discovery occurred in more than half of the cases
filed. 75 Likewise, a survey of discovery costs in the early 1960s showed
that average discovery expenses were substantial.76 However, the
variation among individual cases was broad. Again, some cases had no
discovery, in others it was moderate, and in some it was substantial.77 A
decade later, surveys continued to show that no discovery occurred in
66. GLASER, supra note 47, at 162.
67. Armstrong, supra note 57, at 695.
68. Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil
Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765, 780 (2010).
69. See generally George B. Shepherd, An Empirical Study of the Economics of Pretrial
Discovery, 19 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 245, 253-55 (1999).
70. See generally id.
71. See Speck, supra note 51, at 1150.
72. See id.
73. Id. at 1132.
74. See id. at 1150.
75. See id. at 1134; The Practical Operation of Fed. Discovery, 12 F.R.D. 131, 133 (1952).
76. See GLASER, supra note 47, at 179.
77. See id. at 164-66.
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more than half of cases, and that in cases with discovery, the amount of
discovery varied widely. 78
What followed over the coming years was continued dissatisfaction
with the discovery process interspersed approximately once per decade
with modest reform attempts. 79 Dissatisfaction in the late 1950s and early
1960s led to funding of a large study of discovery practices in the mid1960s. 80 This in turn led to modest amendments in 1970. 81
After another decade of continued dissatisfaction, additional
amendments occurred in 1980 and 1983. 82 The new changes required
additional judicial supervision of discovery. 83 A discovery conference
was now required, signing of discovery requests now certified that such
requests were necessary, and judges were to impose time limits for
discovery and stop discovery that was disproportionate. 84
The changes helped little. 85 Judges refused or were unable to both
police discovery effectively and to make the disproportionality
decisions. 86 The decades since 1938 in which judges had been required to
intervene little in discovery had created habits that were hard to break. 87
In addition, judges felt that they lacked sufficient information about cases
to decide whether discovery requests were proportionate.88 Thus, as
Richard Marcus noted, the changes “were something of a dud.” 89
After another decade of dissatisfaction, the federal discovery
provisions received seemingly important new changes in 1993. 90 There
were numerical limits on depositions, moratoriums on discovery until the
78. See PAUL R. CONNALLY ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL
LITIGATION PROCESS: DISCOVERY 28-29 (1978), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/
jcclpdis.pdf/$file/jcclpdis.pdf [http://perma.cc/TWT8-Q33P]; see also Jeffrey J. Mayer, Prescribing
Cooperation: The Mandatory Pretrial Disclosure Requirement of Proposed Rules 26 and 37 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 12 REV. LITIG. 77, 87-88 n.19 (1992); Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery
in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded
Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1434-35, 1441-42 (1994).
79. See GLASER, supra note 47, at 26-37.
80. Id.
81. Marcus, supra note 19, at 161.
82. See generally Amendments to the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521 (1980);
Amendments to the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 165 (1983).
83. See generally Amendments to the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521;
Amendments to the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 165.
84. See generally Amendments to the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521;
Amendments to the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 165.
85. Marcus, supra note 19, at 162-63.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 163.
90. Amendments to the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401 (1993).
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parties met and submitted a discovery plan to the judge, and most
controversially, mandatory initial disclosures of relevant witnesses and
documents. 91
After additional discontent, especially with mandatory initial
disclosures, additional changes occurred in 2000. 92 The rules limited
mandatory disclosure to documents that supported a party’s claims or
defenses. 93 In addition, the changes narrowed the scope of discovery
modestly. 94
Despite discovery causing lawyers continual irritation, it produced
one great benefit for the profession. Discovery has eventually led to
increases in lawyers’ incomes and the hiring of more lawyers; which
occurred once discovery caused the profession to switch to hourly billing
in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The combination of discovery and
hourly billing was a bonanza for lawyers. 95
Some additional changes then occurred, first by the Supreme Court’s
judicial intervention, and then by amendments to the FRCP in 2015.
D.

The Supreme Court Eliminates Discovery in Many Cases

In two decisions from 2007 and 2009, the Supreme Court recognized
that the decades of tinkering with the rules had not worked. 96 Despite all
of the rule changes, discovery abuse was still pervasive. So, the Supreme
Court effectively eliminated discovery in many cases. 97 It did so not by
changing the discovery rules, but by changing the pleading rules to make
it much more difficult for a plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim. 98 For these cases, the decisions effectively
eliminated discovery. 99
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme
Court abandoned the notice-pleading standard that had existed for more
than half a century. 100 The notice-pleading standard was one of the two
columns that supported the system for broad discovery; in many cases,
91. Marcus, supra note 19, at 163-64.
92. Amendments to the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, 192 F.R.D. 340 (2000).
93. Id.
94. Carl Tobias, Congress and the 2000 Federal Civil Rules Amendments, 22 CARDOZO L.
REV. 75, 80-82 (2000).
95. See Shepherd & Cloud, supra note 8.
96. See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007).
97. See generally Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662; Twombly, 550 U.S. 544.
98. See generally Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662; Twombly, 550 U.S. 544.
99. See generally Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662; Twombly, 550 U.S. 544.
100. See generally Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662; Twombly, 550 U.S. 544.
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discovery was broad only because the combination of notice pleading and
the discovery rules permitted discovery.
Notice pleading and the discovery rules would combine to produce
broad discovery in two steps. First, notice pleading would permit a
complaint to survive until the discovery process began. 101 Until the two
decisions, a plaintiff was permitted to file a complaint that provided the
defendant with nothing but minimal notice about the nature of the
plaintiff’s claims against the defendant. 102 A complaint with few, or no,
facts would usually survive a motion to dismiss.
Second, when the motion to dismiss had been surmounted, the
plaintiff could move on to conduct discovery. 103 The broad discovery
rules would then become important, permitting the plaintiff to obtain
broad categories of information, including, perhaps, the facts that were
necessary to support the allegations in the complaint.
In sum, before the decisions, the combination of notice pleading and
the discovery rules meant that a plaintiff whose complaint contained few
facts could conduct discovery. Indeed, the system permitted plaintiffs to
use discovery to find the facts to support the complaint. As the Court noted
in Hickman v. Taylor in 1947, the new system that the FRCP created was
designed to permit a plaintiff to file a conclusory complaint now, and then
find the facts to support the complaint later in discovery. 104 The Court
stated, “[n]o longer can the time-honored cry of ‘fishing expedition’ serve
to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent’s
case.” 105 The combination of notice pleading and the discovery rules
opened the discovery floodgates.
Twombly and Iqbal have now, in many instances, closed these
floodgates, eliminating discovery in some cases. No longer are fishing
expeditions allowed. The plaintiff must now have facts in hand at the time
of filing the complaint. The plaintiff may no longer file the complaint first
and then use the discovery process to find facts later.
In the two decisions, the Court made it much more difficult for a
plaintiff’s complaint to survive a motion to dismiss and therefore much
more difficult for a plaintiff to be able to proceed far enough in the case
to be permitted to conduct discovery. That is, the decisions’ effect is to
shut off many plaintiffs from access to the discovery process. The two
101. See generally Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662; Twombly, 550 U.S. 544.
102. See generally Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774
(2d Cir. 1944).
103. See generally Conley, 355 U.S. 41; Dioguardi, 139 F.2d 774.
104. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
105. Id.
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decisions have, in many cases, eliminated discovery just as effectively as
would a revision to the FRCP that eliminated depositions, interrogatories,
or requests for production.
The facts of Twombly are simple. The plaintiff alleged that the
defendants had conspired to violate antitrust laws. 106 However, the
plaintiff’s complaint lacked any direct evidence that the defendants had
conspired together. 107 Instead, the plaintiff hoped to acquire such evidence
during the case’s discovery process. 108 That is, the case would have been
just the sort of “fishing expedition” that the Court in Hickman in 1947 had
said was permitted under the system of notice pleading and broad
discovery. 109
The Court’s analysis proceeded as follows. First, the Court
recognized that earlier attempts, noted above, to control and reduce
discovery had failed. 110 For example, the Court wrote that increased
judicial supervision of the discovery process was no solution stating:
It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a plausible entitlement to
relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early in the discovery process
through “careful case management,” given the common lament that the
success of judicial supervision in checking discovery abuse has been on
the modest side. 111

Quoting at length from an article by a federal judge that indicated that
better judicial case management could not reduce discovery abuse, the
Court noted, “[g]iven the system that we have, the hope of effective
judicial supervision is slim.” 112
Likewise, the Court indicated that discovery abuse could not be
eliminated by either increased use of summary judgment or improved jury
instructions: 113 “It is self-evident that the problem of discovery abuse
cannot be solved by ‘careful scrutiny of evidence at the summary
judgment stage,’ much less ‘lucid instructions to juries.’” 114
Instead, even with better case management, better summary
judgment practice, and improved jury instructions, unscrupulous plaintiffs
with frivolous cases could still extort large settlements by threatening to

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
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Id. at 564.
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impose discovery expense. The Court noted that, even with the new
approaches to control discovery abuse, “the threat of discovery expense
will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases before
reaching those proceedings.” 115
The Court then reached its striking conclusion: to eliminate the
possibility of discovery abuse, it was necessary to tighten the pleading
standard—here for pleading conspiracy under § 1 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act. 116 The Court indicated that “it is only by taking care to
require allegations that reach the level suggesting conspiracy that we can
hope to avoid the potentially enormous expense of discovery in cases with
no ‘reasonably founded hope that the [discovery] process will reveal
relevant evidence’ to support a § 1 claim.” 117 Cases that failed to achieve
this pleading standard would be dismissed and prohibited from continuing
on to the next stage where discovery was allowed. 118 That is, a case would
now be dismissed if a plaintiff’s only route to success was through a
discovery fishing expedition.
The later decision in Iqbal made clear that the new pleading standard
applied generally and not just to antitrust cases. 119 Although the opinions
in Twombly and Iqbal did not purport to change interpretation of the
specific discovery rulesRules 31 through 36 of the FRCPthey had the
same impact in many cases as if the Court had revoked the rules. In many
cases in which discovery would have been available before the decisions,
discovery is now no longer available; the plaintiff’s complaint must now
be dismissed before the case reaches the discovery phase.
Twombly and Iqbal represent a fundamental rejection of the
discovery system that the FRCP established in 1938 and that the Court
had protected for seven decades. Concluding that the existing system
created inefficiencies and abuse, and that other judicial and legislative
attempts at cures had failed, the Court stopped merely tinkering. Instead,
it eliminated discovery for many cases. The decisions represent a
fundamental reduction in the number and type of cases in which discovery
is available.
The Court did exactly what this Article proposes, except the Court
eliminated discovery for only some cases. The only difference between
this Article’s proposal and the Court’s resolution of Twombly and Iqbal:

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id. at 556.
Id. at 559 (quoting Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005)).
See id. at 569-70.
See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
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this Article suggests that reform should go further and eliminate broad
discovery in all cases, not just in some of them.
E.

The Ineffectual 2015 Amendments

In 2015, the FRCP were tinkered with some more. Recognizing that
discovery was still often excessive and subject to abuse, the rules were
amended in two main ways. First, Rule 1 was amended to make clear that
both the judge and the litigants were responsible for ensuring that a case
proceeded without abuse, including discovery abuse. Before, Rule 1 had
read: “These rules . . . should be construed and administered to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding.” 120 The 2015 amendments added a few words to make clear
that the people who were required to do the construing and administering
were the judge and litigants. Rule 1 now provides that “[t]hese rules . . .
should be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the
parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action and proceeding.” 121
This amendment does little, if anything. Without the amendments, it
was already clear that the people who were responsible for obtaining just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination were the judge and litigants. When
the original formulation indicated that the rules “should be construed and
administered” to require justice, speed, and efficiency, it was clear that
this meant that the judge was to interpret the rules to foster these goals,
and that the judge was to “administer” the rules so as to impose these
requirements on the litigants. The task of “construing” is the judge’s. And
the people to whom the judge “administers” are the litigants.
The new words add nothing. Before the 2015 amendments, it was
clear that the rules demanded that the judge require the parties to litigate
so as to achieve justice, speed, and efficiency. After the amendments, the
rules indicated exactly the same thing, except with added redundant
language.
The 2015 amendments’ second main alteration was to include in the
specification of the scope of allowable discovery that any discovery be:
proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the
issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’
relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the
burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely
120.
121.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017

FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (2014).
FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (emphasis added).

17

Akron Law Review, Vol. 51 [2017], Iss. 3, Art. 8

834

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[51:817

benefit. 122

At first glance, this might seem to be a major new limit on the scope
of discovery. However, that impression is incorrect. The preexisting
version of the rules already contained almost all of this language, only in
a different, less-central section. The rules prohibited discovery if “the
burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely
That is, even before 2015, the rules required
benefit.” 123
proportionality—that cost did not outweigh benefit. The innovation of the
2015 provision was to use the word “proportional.” However, even before
2015, the proportionality requirement already existed, just without using
the word “proportional.”
Moreover, other than the phrase including “proportional,” the old
wording was very similar to the new. The old wording was:
[T]he court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise
allowed by these rules or by local rule if it determines that . . . the burden
or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit,
considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’
resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues. 124

As can be seen, the new wording is very similar to the old wording above.
The 2015 revisions placed this paragraph in a more central position,
as part of the definition of the scope of discovery, rather than in a separate
section. But this should make little difference to the limitations that the
paragraph imposes. The paragraph imposes the same requirements,
regardless of whether it is moved a half a page from its original position.
The revisions, then, do little except add the word “proportional” to a
preexisting paragraph that already implies a proportionality requirement,
and then move the paragraph to a more central position in the definition
of scope of discovery. The 2015 revision does not change the rules, but
instead just moves them around.
In most every situation, outcomes would be the same under the old
version as under the new. For example, suppose that a lawsuit had modest
stakes of $50,000, but a litigant was proposing to take ten depositions,
which would cost each litigant $5,000 in attorney’s fees and expenses for
each deposition. The depositions would be prohibited under the 2015

122.
123.
124.

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (2014).
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (2014).
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amendments, because the large expense of the depositions was not
“proportional to the needs of the case.”
But the depositions would also have been prohibited before 2015,
because “the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its
likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, [and] the amount in
controversy.” 125
F.

Continuing Major Harms

Despite the continued tinkering at the system’s edges in the 2015
amendments, and despite the changes from Twombly and Iqbal, the
system’s fundamental structure remains intact. Just as before, litigants in
many cases can demand large amounts of information from their
adversaries and impose large costs. Discovery still imposes the harms
about which lawyers and litigants began to complain immediately after
1938. Indeed, changing technology, especially information that is now
available in electronic form, has caused the harms to worsen. 126
There are two reasons why the system does not provoke complete
outrage. First, lawyers often benefit from discovery because it increases
their incomes, although at their clients’ expense. Second, the system has
existed for so long that most have gotten used to it. Almost nobody is alive
who remembers life in the United States without discovery. Familiarity
has deadened almost everyone to its obvious flaws.
The following are discovery’s impacts. They are mainly harmful.
There are two main categories: effects on legal costs and outcomes and
effects on legal culture and relationships.
1. Broad Discovery’s Impacts on Legal Costs and Outcomes
Discovery has increased litigation costs. A large study by the Federal
Judicial Center examined more than 1,000 cases in federal court in case
categories that would tend to have at least some discovery. 127 The results
indicate that discovery consumes approximately half of all litigation
expenditures for the median case. 128

125. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (2014).
126. See generally Ryan J. Reaves, The Dangers of E-Discovery and the New Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 3 OKLA. J.L. & TECH. 32 (2007).
127. See Thomas W. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice
under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 528 (1998).
128. See id. at 531; see also Marcus, supra note 19, at 167.
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In absolute terms, the amounts that discovery consumes are large. 129
The study indicated that discovery, in the median case, consumed
approximately 3% of the stakes. 130 That is, in a case with stakes of $10
million, direct discovery expense would be more than $300,000. Other
earlier studies have produced similar estimates as to both relative and
absolute expenses for discovery. 131
These expenses did not include the costs to the client of disruption
from discovery. For example, not included were the costs of company
employees’ identifying responsive documents. Nor did they include the
large costs of the disruption when officers, directors, and other employees
must be prepared for and attend depositions. Even apart from the direct
legal fees for discovery, the discovery process in substantial litigation can
paralyze a company. Although discovery’s indirect costs are impossible
to measure with accuracy, indirect costs may often exceed the direct costs
for attorney’s fees.
Such costs might be acceptable if they achieved anything beneficial.
However, all of the expense and disruption appears to be
counterproductive. For example, a major benefit that the drafters
promised for the 1938 federal discovery provisions was that discovery
would promote quick settlement. 132 The rules would force each litigant to
put his or her cards on the table. 133 When the litigants could see the relative
strengths of their position and their adversary’s position, cases would
quickly settle. 134 Indeed, the new discovery provisions would do much of
the work in achieving the “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action,” as the drafters promised in their new Rule 1. 135
The predictions have been wrong. As already mentioned, both earlier
and recent studies indicate that rather than increasing the settlement rate,
discovery has reduced it. 136
Because discovery makes the litigation process inefficient and
consumes so much additional lawyer time, it has increased lawyers’
incomes and led to the hiring of many additional lawyers. 137 But the high
incomes for a large population of lawyers is at society’s expense. Incomes
and employment would increase in the nuclear power industry, at least in
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Willging et al., supra note 127, at 548-49.
See id. at 549; Marcus, supra note 19, at 167.
See generally GLASER, supra note 47.
See Marcus, supra note 19, at 170 n.97.
Id.
Id.
FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
See sources cited supra note 57.
Shepherd & Cloud, supra note 8, at 135.
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the short run, if the industry purposefully caused a meltdown. Indeed,
higher incomes and employment for lawyers is one of discovery’s harms,
not a benefit. 138 That lawyers benefit from the waste that discovery causes
does not change the fact of the waste.
Moreover, even if one looks only at discovery’s impacts on the legal
profession—as this Article does in the next section—rather than
appropriately on its impact on society as a whole, the other harms that
discovery causes more than overwhelm the possible financial benefit that
discovery has provided to the profession. The profession, not just society
as a whole, is worse off with discovery.
Although discovery is expensive, disruptive, and decreases the
settlement rate, it might nonetheless be worthwhile if it produced
outcomes with more justice. Occasionally, discovery achieves this goal. 139
For example, plaintiffs in a products liability case may discover the
smoking-gun document that establishes the defendant’s liability. 140 For
example in Grimshaw v. Ford, the plaintiff obtained discovery of an
internal Ford document that indicated that the company had, in deciding
not to install a cheap safety device, balanced the cost of the device against
the value of the lives that might be saved. 141 Likewise, in a U.S.
Department of Justice antitrust suit against Microsoft, the government
obtained many of Bill Gates’s and other executives’ internal emails in
which they indicated their intention to squash the competition. 142
However, the discovery process often produces injustice instead.
Eventually, plaintiffs started to win cases against tobacco companies in
part because of internal company documents—although the documents
were often obtained by leaks from employees rather than through the
discovery process. 143 However, a major tool that tobacco companies had
successfully used for decades to fend off tobacco plaintiffs was
discovery. 144 The companies would bury tobacco plaintiffs in intrusive,
expensive discovery requests about the plaintiffs’ personal history—such
as inquiries into plaintiffs’ earlier use of illegal drugs—while at the same
time resisting the plaintiffs’ discovery requests doggedly. 145
138. Id. at 162.
139. See generally Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757 (1981).
140. See generally id.
141. Id. at 800.
142. Ellen Neuborne, Microsoft’s Teflon Bill, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 30, 1998),
www.businessweek.com/1998/48/b3606125.htm [http://perma.cc/B482-WKU6].
143. See generally Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 170 F.R.D. 481 (D. Kan. 1997).
144. Milo Geyelin & Ann Davis, Tobacco: A Vast Trove of Tobacco Documents Opens Up—
Tobacco Foes Target Role of Lawyers, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 23, 1998), at B1.
145. Id.
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Likewise, defendants in cases involving birth defects and illnesses
from birth control devices and drugs used during pregnancy would
intimidate plaintiffs with massive discovery requests. 146 The requests
would seek disclosure of plaintiffs’ sex histories and other embarrassing
information. 147 The broad scope of discovery would permit intrusion into
these areas, even though the information that was sought was barely
relevant. Intimidated and outspent in a litigation war of attrition, the
plaintiffs would often abandon the cases or settle cheaply. 148
In many cases, discovery is not a weapon for justice, but for injustice.
Indeed, studies show that litigants frequently use discovery not
legitimately to obtain necessary information. 149 Instead, they impose
discovery requests strategically to impose costs. 150 Some cases descend
into discovery wars of attrition with each litigant attempting to use
discovery requests to exhaust the adversary.
No data exists on the relative sizes of the groups of cases where
discovery promotes justice rather than deters it. This author’s own
experience in litigation, augmented by discussions from many other
experienced litigators, is that only rarely does discovery produce the
smoking-gun document that makes a difference to a case’s outcome.
Rarely does such a smoking gun exist. If it does exist, photocopy
technology often causes it to exist not only in the defendant’s internal
files, but also in external sources such as the files of lawyers, accountants,
or disgruntled employees. In this way, that document would be available
even without discovery.
Discovery’s usual impact is to either achieve the same result as
would have occurred without discovery with much more trouble and
expense, or to distort the result away from justice with just as much
trouble and expense. A litigation partner in the large law firm of
Debevoise & Plimpton while discussing foreign legal systems without
discovery noted:
There may be a few smoking guns (more likely, water pistols) that are
not unearthed, and perhaps even a few truly meritorious suits that do not
succeed. But it is extremely doubtful that these few exceptions justify
the overwhelming burdens and abuses wrought by our current system of

146. MORTON MINTZ, AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN AND THE DALKON SHIELD
(Pantheon 1985).
147. Id.
148. Information about defense tactics of defendants mentioned in these paragraphs comes, in
part, from the personal experiences of the author.
149. See Shepherd, supra note 69, at 251.
150. Id.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol51/iss3/8

22

Shepherd: Superficial 2015 Amendments

2017]

SUPERFICIAL 2015 AMENDMENTS

839

pretrial practice and discovery. 151

Indeed, corporations and wealthy people may use the threat of
discovery to intimidate potential litigants into refraining even from filing
suit. For decades, many potential tobacco plaintiffs would not sue because
they foresaw the discovery barrage that the tobacco companies and their
legions of lawyers would throw at them if they did. 152 Indeed, that was
one of the tobacco industry’s main tactics: deter additional lawsuits by
litigating each one that was filed in the most expensive, scorched-earth
way possible. 153 A main way of imposing the expense was through
discovery. 154
Litigants make the decision whether to sue in the shadow of the
discovery process. It is certain that many lawsuits with strong merits that
would otherwise succeed are never filed because of the discovery process.
Opportunities for litigants to impose costs and intimidate have
further increased in the past two decades as discovery of electronic
information has begun. 155 A corporate defendant will fear a request for all
of the company’s emails relating to a certain issue. The review of this
mass of material for privilege and relevance would be expensive and timeconsuming.
By increasing litigation’s costs and the uncertainty of these costs,
wide-open discovery has restricted access to legal services for some of
society’s most vulnerable groups. Both the increase in litigation costs and
the increased uncertainty raises the effective price of litigating a case.
Those with the least wealth are least able to pay the higher price. By
increasing litigation’s costs, broad discovery effectively denies these
vulnerable groups recourse to lawyers, the courts, and justice.
Moreover, wide-open discovery increases litigation’s effective cost
most for those who are risk averse and who are thus most sensitive to the
risk from discovery. 156 These tend to be small businesses and individuals
with few assets, for whom the risk of an unexpectedly large legal bill is
unbearable. 157 In contrast, large corporations and wealthy individuals tend

151. Loren Kieve, Discovery Reform, 77 AM. B. ASS’N J. 79, 81 (1991).
152. See generally Christine Hatfield, The Privilege Doctrines—Are They Just Another
Discovery Tool Utilized by the Tobacco Industry to Conceal Damaging Information?, 16 PACE L.
REV. 525 (1996).
153. Id. at 558-60.
154. Id.
155. Lance Shapiro, E-Discovery: Bargaining Bytes for Settlement, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
887, 887-88 (2014).
156. See Shepherd & Cloud, supra note 8, at 103-04.
157. Id.
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to be less risk averse. 158 In this sense, wide-open discovery weighs the
scales of justice against small businesses and poor individuals and in favor
of large corporations and the wealthy. 159
This is true for both potential plaintiffs and defendants. Discovery’s
expense and uncertainty prevented some plaintiffs from asserting valid
claims. For example, a plaintiff who, before the introduction of wide-open
discovery, might have sued his or her landlord for illegally failing to
maintain his or her apartment now may be unable to afford to sue. Under
hourly billing, the potential plaintiff expects even this small case to
require a prohibitive number of expensive hours of attorney time, many
for discovery. Moreover, although the case might settle quicker than
expected, there is also a substantial possibility that litigation costs would
explode and drain the plaintiff’s assets. Unable to bear discovery’s
expense or risk, the potential plaintiff may not assert his or her rights.
Similarly, the plaintiff is unable to obtain representation on a contingency
or at an affordable fixed fee because discovery has increased both the
expected cost and the cost uncertainty that attorneys must cover. So,
plaintiff’s contingency lawyers refuse cases that, absent discovery, they
would have accepted. Or if fixed-fee representation is available, its price
is prohibitive.
Conversely, the cost and uncertainty of broad discovery prevented
some defendants from obtaining representation to defend against invalid
claims. Some defendants may settle even invalid claims for substantial
sums because the settlement sums are cheaper than the large new costs
that discovery imposes.
Defenders of the discovery process proclaim as a main argument in
favor of the process that most cases have no discovery. 160 That many
litigants avoid the discovery process is not evidence that the process
functions well. To the contrary, it supports the conclusion that the system
functions poorly. If the discovery process was so wonderful, then half of
the litigants would not, in effect, choose to opt out of it. Moreover, if
discovery was eliminated, these litigants would not miss it at all; indeed,
they have taken matters into their own hands and eliminated it in their own
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Stephen N. Subrin, Discovery in Global Perspective: Are We Nuts?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV.
299, 308 (2002). For example, Stephen Subrin argued:
What neither foreign commentators on American discovery nor homegrown conservative
critics tend to mention is the extensive empirical research in our country demonstrating
that in many American civil cases, often approaching fifty percent, there is no discovery,
and in most of the remainder of the cases there is remarkably little.
Id.
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cases themselves. That most potential users of discovery avoid it may
suggest that something about discovery is very wrong.
Litigants’ decision not to use discovery can be explained in two
ways, neither of which indicates that the discovery process functions well.
First, some cases may have such small stakes or clear evidence that
discovery is not worth its substantial time, expense, and disruption. This
is not evidence that the discovery process works well. Instead, it shows
that discovery is too expensive, time-consuming, and disruptive for most
cases.
Second, even if a litigant’s case has large stakes and important
factual disputes, the litigant nonetheless may seek no discovery for fear
that doing so will trigger the adversary to impose expensive discovery
requests on the litigant. Empirical studies show an important influence on
the amount of discovery that a litigant seeks is the amount his or her
adversary seeks, regardless of the litigant’s real need for information. 161
A litigant may fear that conducting any discovery will induce the
adversary to strike back in kind, triggering an expensive discovery war of
attrition. 162 Experienced lawyers and their clients have seen too many
other cases in which discovery and its expense have spun out of control. 163
Like the United States and Soviet Union with their missiles pointed at
each other during the Cold War, an equilibrium results in some cases in
which neither party conducts discovery.
This explanation again demonstrates a basic flaw in the discovery
process: it can be used not only to obtain information, but also to impose
costs and disruption on the adversary. The fact that in many cases these
threats balance out to the point that both litigants are intimidated into
conducting no discovery shows only that discovery creates a fear of
mutual assured destruction, not that the discovery process is a good idea.
Twombly and Iqbal have eliminated some of the harms from
discovery. 164 But they have not eliminated all of them. For example,
suppose that a case survives to the discovery phase because the complaint
offers sufficient facts to satisfy the new pleading standard. Both the
plaintiff and defendant may then seek to gain advantage by conducting
abusive discovery. Full elimination of discovery’s dangers can be
achieved only by eliminating discovery completely.

161. See Shepherd, Empirical Study, supra note 69, at 251.
162. Id.
163. See, e.g., id.
164. See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007).
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Moreover, the uneven prohibition of discovery that Twombly and
Iqbal imposed is not ideal. The two cases eliminate potentially abusive
discovery by plaintiffs in some cases, but not by defendants. It would be
better to eliminate broad discovery for all parties evenhandedly.
2. Discovery Harms Legal Culture and Relationships
Broad discovery not only increases expense and warps case
outcomes, it also corrodes both the practice of law and relationships
between lawyers and clients.
First, the discovery process is intensely boring. It requires both the
creation of mountains of paper and tedious attention to detail. It is not
much of an overstatement to assert that it has ruined the practice of law.
Before discovery came to dominate litigation, the day-to-day activity in
litigation was much more fun. 165 Regardless of their pay, trial lawyers, as
they were called then, could enjoy their jobs. 166 People who were not in it
solely for the money would become lawyers. 167 Many lawyers recall a
golden era of litigation that ended, perhaps without coincidence, just as
discovery became dominant. 168
Now, in contrast, discovery has made much of litigation so tedious
that many litigators, as they are now called, conclude that the only reason
to do it is for the high pay. 169 In recent decades, lawyers’ pay at the top
firms has increased at the same time that the lawyers in them have become
more miserable. 170 Associate turnover at the best firms has reached
stunning levels, often 20% per year. 171 A typical first-year associate is a
smart idealist who has learned all about lawyers’ being statesmen in a
noble profession. 172 Often within a year, the associate is crushed into
165. See MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 20-21 (1st ed. 1994).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 22-23.
168. See MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS 32-36 (Univ. of
Chi. Press 1991); GLENDON, supra note 165, at 17-39; ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER
291-92 (Harvard Univ. Press 1993); WILLIAM G. ROSS, THE HONEST HOUR 5-6 (Carolina Acad. Press
1996). Alternately, it might be that lawyers of any given era always tend to believe that the previous
generation of lawyers was more moral. For example, during the 1930s—the supposed golden age—
many lawyers proclaimed vigorously that moral standards had fallen precipitously compared to the
previous generation. See, e.g., George B. Shepherd & William G. Shepherd, Scholarly Restraints?
ABA Accreditation and Legal Education, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 2091, 2117-19 (1998).
169. GLENDON, supra note 165, at 25-26.
170. GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 168, at 34-36.
171. See Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, What Drives Turnover and Layoffs at Large Law Firms?,
GEO. U. (2010), www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/centers-institutes/legal-profession/documents/
upload/Conference-Papers-March-23-oyerlayoffs.pdf [http://perma.cc/T7WD-6ZFV].
172. GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 168, at 36.
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disillusioned depression by the tedious, wasteful reality of big-firm
discovery practice. 173 Contributing to the demoralization is the growing
understanding that much of the discovery contributes little to justice and
is used to intimidate adversaries or pad legal bills.
The associate may look longingly at friends who work in practices
that include little discovery, such as criminal prosecution or criminal
defense, smaller-scale litigation with individual clients, or other work for
state and local government.
Second, broad discovery injures the relationship between lawyer and
client. So-called “principal-agent conflicts” exist and create opportunities
for abuse when an agent who has authority to make decisions on a
principal’s behalf has different incentives than the principal. For example,
much waste may exist in the medical profession because doctors often
have broad discretion to decide what procedures and medications to use,
but insurance companies pay for them.
The discovery process has worsened the principal-agent conflict
between lawyers and clients substantially because it provides lawyers
with broad new discretion to spend large amounts of their clients’ money.
Before 1938, there was little that a dishonest trial lawyer could do to pad
her bills. 174 The tasks in a case were relatively set and straightforward. 175
Moreover, litigators were generally paid fixed fees rather than billing by
the hour. 176
However, broad discovery’s introduction gave lawyers broad new
opportunities for exploiting their clients. As lawyers began to be paid by
the hour, an unscrupulous lawyer could conduct excessive discovery to
increase his or her income. A client would have little choice but to accept
the lawyer’s decision about the appropriate discovery level, even though
the client would know that his or her attorney had an incentive and
opportunity to cheat. Some attorneys undoubtedly did cheat; some could
not resist an open cookie jar.
The result was a new mistrust of lawyers. 177 The rise of broad
discovery occurred at the same time that both the supposed golden age for
lawyers ended and public perceptions of lawyers declined.178 Indeed,
lawyers now rank near the bottom of polls on the public’s perceptions of

173. See id.
174. See ROSS, supra note 168, at 14-25.
175. Shepherd & Cloud, supra note 8, 120-26.
176. Id.
177. See Honesty/Ethics in Professions, GALLUP (Dec. 2014), http://www.gallup.com/
poll/1654/Honesty-Ethics-Professions.aspx?version=print [http://perma.cc/26FP-RFL6].
178. Id.
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ethical behavior, along with insurance salesmen and car salesmen. 179 In
all of these professions, customers must rely on expert professionals for
information in situations in which the expert’s interests conflict with the
interests of the individual. Perhaps absent discovery, lawyers would be
perceived more like members of professions for which the public has
greater trust. 180
Third, broad discovery rots relationships among lawyers. Because
the amount of discovery to conduct is within each opposing litigant’s
discretion, a danger exists in every case that the adversary will perceive
any discovery request from a litigant as too much. 181 If the adversary is
paying his or her attorney on a contingency, then the expense of
responding to the discovery request comes straight out of the attorney’s
wallet. It is no surprise that surveys show that, in high proportions of
cases, at least one litigant believes the adversary is conducting excessive
discovery. 182
Moreover, in addition to creating the possibility of incorrect
perceptions of discovery excess, the discovery process creates new
opportunities for unscrupulous lawyers actually to oppress their
colleagues and gain unfair advantage.183 The introduction of discovery
into litigation is like the introduction of the machine gun onto the
battlefield. In the wrong hands, the new weapon creates many new
opportunities for litigation mayhem and destruction.
The hurt and mistrust among lawyers that the discovery process
creates infects their relationships outside the courtroom. Lawyers now
view themselves less as part of a cohesive, proud profession and more as
lone gladiators, mistrustful of the knife in the back from a colleague. 184
G.

Discovery is Inconsistent with the Adversary System

The discovery process can function fairly and efficiently only if the
litigants cooperate with each other. They must not seek to gain unfair
advantage by seeking excessive discovery, or by resisting valid discovery
inappropriately.
But it is so tempting to seek large amounts of discovery. By doing
so, they hope to gain advantage by imposing costs on their adversaries. It
is so tempting to seek five depositions when one would do. It is so
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Changes Ahead in Fed. Pretrial Discovery, 45 F.R.D. 479, 489 (1968).
Id.
Id.
See GLENDON, supra note 165, at 36-38.
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tempting to propound large numbers of interrogatories when a small
number would be sufficient. It is so tempting to seek large amounts of
documents when there is really only need for a few.
The excessive discovery may not only help the lawyer’s client by
imposing costs on the adversary. In addition, the excessive discovery
helps the lawyer; a lawyer who is paid by the hour can bill more hours by
conducting more discovery.
Likewise, it is tempting for a litigant to resist all of the adversary’s
attempts to obtain discovery, even the adversary’s discovery attempts that
are appropriate and valid. The litigant may seek a protective order even
against an appropriate deposition. The litigant may assert shaky claims of
privilege and work product against appropriate interrogatories. Faced with
valid requests for production, the litigant may refuse to produce
responsive documents, asserting weak claims of work product.
As with seeking excessive discovery, the excessive resistance to the
adversary’s discovery helps both the client and lawyer. The client benefits
because the excessive resistance imposes costs on the adversary,
intimidating the adversary in a discovery war of attrition. The resistance
also benefits the lawyer, because the resistance allows the lawyer to bill
more hours, dream up creative claims of privilege and work product, and
draft motions for protective orders.
These incentives for litigation excess are not unique to the discovery
process. A quick look at the docket sheet for any case with large stakes
shows many litigation events with dubious support. For example, any
experienced lawyer knows that a plaintiff’s lawyer will routinely file not
only strong claims, but also accompanying claims that are weak.
Likewise, defense lawyers will file weak motions to dismiss and
summary judgment motions. Indeed, at the law firm where I began
practice, junior associates were initially all given a securities claim to
defend. The supervising senior attorney instructed us all immediately to
file a large discovery request, a motion to dismiss, and a summary
judgment motion. This was the advice for every one of these securities
claims, regardless of the stakes, and regardless of the merits of an
individual case. The supervising attorney indicated that these three
devices would intimidate the plaintiff, and show the plaintiff that we
would be tough.
But the level of expense that a litigant can impose through excess
discovery activity is much greater than can be imposed through weak
claims or through meritless motions to dismiss or for summary judgment.
A meritless motion to dismiss or for summary judgment might take a few
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weeks of attorney time to fend off. In contrast, excessive discovery can
consume years.
The courts deal with both weak claims by plaintiffs and weak
motions to dismiss and weak summary judgment motions within the
adversary system. Through decisions such as Twombly and Iqbal, judges
are trained to dismiss weak claims quickly and efficiently. Celotex is
another decision that helps judges dismiss certain claims quickly; a
plaintiff’s claim will be dismissed on summary judgment unless the
plaintiff has facts to support it. 185 Likewise, appellate decisions teach
judges how to deal quickly and efficiently with both weak motions to
dismiss and weak summary judgment motions. Examples of such
doctrines in summary judgment are those that instruct the judge to assume
that the jury will believe the witnesses of the nonmoving party. 186
But in dealing with weak claims and weak motions to dismiss and
for summary judgment, the system does not, in practice, require litigants
to abandon our litigation system’s adversarial nature. Plaintiffs routinely
file weak claims, and judges just as routinely dismiss them. Defendants
routinely file weak motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. Judges
routinely dismiss the motions. The adversarial system is tasked with
dealing with the weak claims and motions. Lawyers, representing their
clients vigorously, are permitted to file weak claims and weak motions.
The system then offers means for the claims and motions to be dismissed.
As in organized sports such as football, rules are established subject to
which the participants are permitted to try their hardest—to represent their
clients vigorously. 187
Except for in the area of discovery, adversarial, self-interested
litigation effort is assumed to produce a good outcome. The litigants’
butting heads in self-interested combat will produce efficient justice. This
is the whole basis of the U.S. adversarial system. 188 Lawyers’ vigorous
representation of their clients, within the rules, is to be encouraged,
because it will lead to a just efficient outcome.
Discovery is different. The rules permit the various discovery
devices, but then they exhort the litigants to restrain themselves in using
them. For example, even if a discovery device would otherwise be

185. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
186. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, Part II(A) (1986).
187. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT PREAMBLE AND SCOPE (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015)
(“As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position under the rules of the adversary
system.”).
188. See Robert Gilbert Johnston & Sara Lufrano, The Adversary System as a Means of Seeking
Truth and Justice, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 147 (2002).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol51/iss3/8

30

Shepherd: Superficial 2015 Amendments

2017]

SUPERFICIAL 2015 AMENDMENTS

847

allowed in a case, the device is discouraged unless it is “proportional,” or
if “the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely
benefit.” 189 In addition, in deciding whether to use a discovery device, the
litigant is asked to consider “the parties’ resources.” 190 Apparently, the
rules would smile on a litigant conducting a given discovery method
against a wealthy adversary, but would discourage the litigant from using
exactly the same method in exactly the same case, except that the
adversary was less wealthy.
That is, unlike in the rest of the litigation process, litigants
conducting discovery are asked not to litigate with full vigor. The litigant
cannot merely use discovery vigorously, as long as specific rules for
specific discovery devices are obeyed. Instead, the litigant is asked to
consider factors other than their client’s interests. It is like a football
player being asked not to try their hardest, to not tackle hard in an
unimportant game, or in a game where the opponent has a lower budget
to pay their players.
Discovery is inconsistent with the normal adversarial process. In
areas other than discovery, litigants are permitted and encouraged to
litigate vigorously. Indeed, a lawyer may have an ethical duty to represent
her client with vigor; a lawyer who did not represent her client vigorously
would be shirking her duty to her client. However, in discovery, the
normal vigor is forbidden. In this one area, lawyers are expected to
consider factors other than their client’s interests.
The conflict between lawyer’s instinct to vigorously represent her
client and the rules’ requirement that the lawyer ignore their client’s
interests and do only “proportionate” discovery leads to inconsistent
amounts of discovery even in cases with similar characteristics. In some
cases, lawyers give in to their traditional instincts to consider only their
client’s interests in deciding their amount of discovery; they do a large
amount of discovery if it benefits their clients. In other cases, the lawyers
observe the proportionality guidance, doing less discovery than the
amount that would maximize benefit to their clients.
This outcome is harmful for three reasons. First, like cases are not
litigated similarly. In some cases, much discovery occurs. In other similar
cases, little does. Litigation expense is high in some cases, but low in other
similar cases. 191 Because the amount of discovery can alter a case’s
outcome, outcomes will be different even in identical cases.

189.
190.
191.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
Id.
See Shepherd & Cloud, supra note 8, at 126.

31

Akron Law Review, Vol. 51 [2017], Iss. 3, Art. 8

848

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[51:817

Second, the outcome is harmful because it creates stressful internal
conflicts for lawyers. The rules require the lawyer to pursue two
objectives simultaneously: choose the discovery amount that allows the
attorney to represent her client with utmost vigor and choose a discovery
amount that is “proportional.” These two objectives conflict, stressing the
lawyer; attempting to serve two masters’ conflicting directives causes
anxiety.
Asking a lawyer both to represent their client with vigor and also
conduct only proportional and restrained discovery is against human
nature. It is like sending a warrior into battle with a savage weapon, but
then requiring them to be gentle in using it.
Third, the system causes conflict and suspicion among lawyers.
Lawyers who focus on the proportionality objective resent lawyers who
ignore proportionality and instead focus on vigorously representing their
clients. The lawyers who focus on proportionality view those who do not
as gaining an unfair advantage. They view the other lawyers the same way
a drug-free professional bicyclist would view other bicyclists who use
performance-enhancing drugs.
H.

Discovery Violates Norms of Privacy

Broad discovery violates norms of privacy. Before 1938, a societal
expectation existed that things said or written in privacy would remain
private. 192 It is human nature to demand a zone of privacy. Indeed, the
U.S. Constitution enshrines privacy as a fundamental right. 193 People in
the United States expect privacy, especially from intrusions by their
government. Indeed, outside of the discovery process, the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution have been interpreted as
creating certain rights to privacy. The government may not intrude into a
citizen’s private decisions about contraception, abortion, or homosexual
sex. 194
The normal right to privacy that U.S. citizens enjoy does not exist
during the litigation process. The FRCP permit a government agency—
the courts—and a government official—the judge—to intrude into a
citizen’s most private matters, merely because the citizen has sued or been

192. See generally Amendments to the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, 48 F.R.D. 487 (1970).
193. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
194. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), which all interpret the 14th Amendment to create a right to
privacy surrounding these activities.
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sued. In effect, the rules indicate that, by being involved in a lawsuit, the
parties forfeit their privacy rights.
This forfeiture is broad. The scope of discovery is immense. The
adversary can obtain from the party any relevant information that is not
privileged and not work product. 195 Relevance is interpreted broadly to
include any material that could matter at all to the litigation, even just a
tiny bit. 196
Likewise, privileges apply only to small categories of
communications, such as those between lawyer and client. Moreover,
privileges are interpreted narrowly. 197
Accordingly, the courts routinely allow deeply intrusive discovery,
violating the deeply-held privacy norm. The adversary can require the
litigant to provide stunningly personal and private information. Many
private discussions and written communications are unprivileged and
discoverable. 198 For example, those who have not become deadened to the
system may often be shocked that a litigant may obtain copies of almost
all of a corporation’s private emails. 199 In the Microsoft antitrust case, the
government’s most powerful evidence was informal internal emails
between Microsoft’s top leadership. 200 Likewise discoverable—for
example in a divorce proceeding—are the contents of an individual’s
computer, including the embarrassing websites that the person has visited
and love letters that the person has received. 201
The adversary is even allowed to intrude into the litigant’s bedroom,
with the litigant sometimes being required to disclose intimate details of
their sexual practices. For example, in cases where women have alleged
that they were injured and rendered infertile by dangerous morningsickness drugs or defective birth control devices, defendants have been
permitted to compel the plaintiffs to reveal the identities of all of their
prior sexual partners, and whether the sexual partners had sexuallytransmitted diseases. 202

195. FED. R. CIV. P. 26.
196. See FED. R. EVID. 401 (“Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more
or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in
determining the action.”).
197. See, e.g., United States v. Marashi, 913 F.2d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 1990).
198. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft, Co., 253 F.3d 34, 76 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See, e.g., Byrne v. Byrne, 650 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500 (App. Div. 1996).
202. Richard Marcus, The Discovery Confidentiality Controversy, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 457
(1991).
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So, we have seen that, by being involved in a lawsuit, the litigants
forfeit their rights to privacy. This is not a voluntary waiver. Instead, this
is an involuntary forfeiture. It is easy to see that forfeiture is involuntary
for the defendant. The defendant is a party to the litigation against her
will: she is a party only because the plaintiff sued her.
Similarly, the plaintiff’s waiver is effectively involuntary. The
plaintiff/victim must sue the defendant only because the defendant injured
her, whether through tort or breach of contract. However, the defendant’s
act of injuring the victim was beyond the plaintiff’s control; the victim did
not ask to be injured. The victim is forced to sue only because of what the
defendant did, which is beyond the victim’s control. Both the plaintiff and
the defendant are parties only because of the other’s independent conduct.
The defendant is a party because the plaintiff sued the defendant. The
plaintiff is a party because the defendant injured the plaintiff. Nonetheless,
their participation in the lawsuit, although involuntary, forfeits their
normal rights to privacy.
People from other countries are shocked at U.S. discovery’s
intrusiveness. People with whom this author has spoken who lived in
former East Germany remember vividly the deadening horror of the fear
that the secret police were monitoring their private lives. They view
discovery’s intrusiveness as similar. Both the secret police in former East
Germany and courts in the United States have invaded citizens’ most
private domains. People in Europe remember too well the degree to which
the Nazi government controlled the population in part by reaching deeply
into people’s private lives. Indeed, for oppressive governments,
knowledge of people’s private information is often power.
In many other countries, recent history offers dramatic examples of
horrid leaders preserving power by violating privacy. That is one
important reason why almost all other countries have rejected the U.S.
system of broad discovery. 203 Government spying by discovery resembles
too closely other sinister forms of government spying.
Something important is lost when private individuals may not
communicate in private without the constant threat that government
agents—and that is what the courts are—will listen in. If everyone were
not so accustomed to discovery’s intrusiveness, everyone would see more
clearly that the discovery process brings the United States frighteningly

203.

See infra Section III.
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close to the world in George Orwell’s 1984. 204 Only here, Big Brother is
a court enforcing an order compelling discovery. 205
The United States is alone in allowing the courts to intrude in this
way into privacy. 206 For example, European legal systems are motivated
much more deeply by an underlying expectation of the privacy of both
personal and business information. 207
The dissonance between citizens’ expectations of privacy and the
discovery process’s violations of these privacy norms lead to many of the
discovery system’s troubles. Because broad discovery grinds against
human nature, litigants who receive discovery requests often resist them
compulsively. This leads to endless cycles of evasions and motions to
compel. Broad discovery is like 1920s prohibition. Citizens tend to like
both privacy and alcohol. Any attempt to intrude on either privacy or
drinking leads to resistance and unhappiness. Because it violated
ingrained human preferences, prohibition was a failure. Likewise, broad
discovery is a failure because it violates important privacy norms.
III. ENDING THE FAILED EXPERIMENT
As discussed in this Article, broad discovery has inflicted substantial
injuries on society and the legal profession, with very few benefits. The
cure is clear: remove the discovery cancer.208
The world would be a better place without broad discovery. Indeed,
the absence of broad discovery has already improved conditions in all
other parts of the world except the United States; wide-open discovery
exists only here. 209 The United States should respect the combined and
consistent judgment of every other country that broad discovery is bad
policy. Confronted with strong evidence of discovery’s harms, the United
States should cease asserting that it knows better than everyone else.
Although it would be best to eliminate U.S.-style broad discovery,
strictly-limited discovery might appropriately remain available in
exceptional circumstances. For example, the United States might model
reforms on the present systems in Britain, Europe, or Japan. 210 In these
204. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (Signet Classic Pub. 1949).
205. See generally id.
206. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 19, at 193.
207. Id. at 193-94.
208. A brief earlier essay also called for elimination of broad discovery. Kieve, supra note 151.
Other scholars have contrasted the U.S. discovery process with that in other countries, but not called
for its elimination. See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 160.
209. See Marcus, supra note 19, at 154-55.
210. For a description of these systems, see generally Burkhard Bastuck & Burkard Gopfert,
Admission and Presentation of Evidence in Germany, 16 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 609 (1994);
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systems, litigants may sometimes obtain limited discovery after
convincing a judge of exceptional need. 211 Often, discovery that takes
place is conducted by the judge, not by the litigants. 212 The modest
variations in the world’s countries with limited discovery provide a
perfect natural experiment for selecting the best approach.
Recommending the details of the best new system is a topic for future
research.
One might fear that individual plaintiffs suing large organizations
would be unable to obtain the secret internal documents that would be
necessary to prove liability. However, in general, broad discovery harms
the individual litigant rather than helping him. As already discussed, cases
where discovery produces a smoking gun are rare. It is probable that more
often, discovery is now used as a weapon by the large organizations to
gain unfair advantage over the individual litigant.
Moreover, the problem of secret internal documents may be reduced,
if not eliminated, by altering burdens of proof. For example, Germany and
many other countries impose strict liability on defendants in most product
liability suits. 213 In suits where a negligence rule still applies, many
countries’ courts do not require the plaintiff to prove the defendant’s
negligence. 214 Instead, they shift the burden of proof to the defendant to
rebut a presumption of fault. 215 Unless the defendant successfully carries
the burden, the plaintiff wins the suit, but without requiring discovery. 216
Moreover, in these other systems, there is no opportunity for the defendant
to use discovery to intimidate.
Burdens could be shifted similarly in other areas in which defendants
might have sole access to important evidence. For example, in a suit for
fraud against a large organization, the U.S. system requires the plaintiff to
produce evidence that the defendant knew of a statement’s falsity. Before
Twombly and Iqbal, the plaintiff could attempt to obtain such information
through discovery of the defendant’s internal documents. An alternative
would be to shift the burden of proof: once the plaintiff proves falsity, the
Benjamin Kaplan et al., Phases of German Civil Procedure I, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1193 (1958); John
H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (1985); Marcus,
supra note 19; Itsuko Mori, The Difference Between U.S. Discovery and Japanese Taking of Evidence,
23 INT’L LAW. 3 (1989); Craig P. Wagnild, Civil Law Discovery in Japan: A comparison of Japanese
and U.S. Methods of Evidence Collection in Civil Litigation, 3 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 1 (2002).
211. See generally sources cited supra note 206.
212. See generally sources cited supra note 206.
213. See Reimann, supra note 14, at 764; Hans Claudius Taschner, Harmonization of Product
Liability Law in the European Community, 34 TEX. INT’L L.J. 21, 25-27 (1999).
214. See Reimann, supra note 14, at 790-91; Taschner, supra note 213, at 27-28.
215. See Reimann, supra note 14, at 790-91; Taschner, supra note 213, at 27-28.
216. See Reimann, supra note 14, at 790-91; Taschner, supra note 213, at 27-28.
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defendant would have the burden to prove the absence of knowledge of
falsity.
One need not speculate about whether eliminating broad discovery
would function well. The system proposed in this Article already works
well in scores of other countries. As Professor Subrin has noted about
many U.S. commentators’ skepticism about various aspects of the U.S.
discovery system, “[t]his skepticism has to be heightened when one looks
at civil discovery in the rest of the world, where civilizations seemed to
have survived quite well without American discovery.” 217
Indeed, admittedly inexact bottom-line indicators of legal systems’
relative effectiveness suggest that systems without broad discovery
perform no worse than, and perhaps better than, the U.S. system. For
example, one important underlying goal of a liability system is to deter
injurious conduct. 218 Even without broad discovery, the German system
appears to compare favorably with the U.S. system. The automobile
accidental death rate in Germany is less than half the U.S. rate. 219
Although this data ignores other important influences on death rates, it
suggests that the absence of broad discovery in Germany is not inducing
Germans and German automobile manufacturers to run amok in creating
dangerous automobiles.
As discussed elsewhere, the elimination of broad discovery would
also permit many clients and lawyers to abandon both hourly billing and
to avoid all of the problems that it causes. 220
Elimination of broad discovery might require modest changes in
other parts of the legal system. As others have noted, other parts of the
system are premised on the existence of broad discovery. 221 For example,
because the U.S. system of notice pleading often requires little detail in
plaintiffs’ complaints, an important means for defendants to learn of
plaintiffs’ specific assertions is through discovery. Thus, the elimination
of discovery might need to be accompanied by a requirement of greater
specificity in pleadings. This would not be a new or unfamiliar
requirement. Instead it would merely extend to all cases the present

217. Subrin, supra note 160, at 301.
218. See generally Taschner, supra note 213.
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on Mar. 6, 2018).
220. Shepherd & Cloud, supra note 8.
221. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 19, at 156; Subrin, supra note 160, at 308-10; see generally
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Discovery and the Role of the Judge in Civil Law Jurisdictions, 73 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1017 (1998).
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requirements of FRCP 9(b) that fraud be pled with particularity. 222
Twombly and Iqbal are already nudging the litigation system in this
direction. 223
One might also need to hire more judges. A possible objection to
eliminating broad discovery is that it would place excessive reliance on
judges to gather information—if rules were also changed to permit judges,
instead of litigants, to conduct more fact-finding, as in many legal
European systems. 224 Unlike European judges, the argument goes, U.S.
judges are unaccustomed and unfit to administer the gathering of
information. 225 Moreover, they are often already overwhelmed by heavy
caseloads, especially their criminal dockets. 226
This problem might be solved by hiring more judges. However, even
if the United States hired no new judges and the existing judges remained
resistant to administering discovery closely, the system would merely
suffer from many of the same problems as European courts. European
judges also tend to be lazy in their fact gathering. 227 Instead, European
courts demonstrate “a considerable degree of tolerance—almost
insouciance, to common law eyes—for the incompleteness of evidentiary
material.” 228
Instead, European systems rely on litigants to assemble their own
information from their own sources, rather than relying on the adversary
for information. 229 In situations where only the adversary often has
information, the systems tend to shift the burden to the adversary, rather
than requiring the adversary to produce information. 230
A final impact of the elimination of broad discovery would be that
many litigators would lose their jobs. The cuts would be especially great
in big firms, where the cases that spawn profuse discovery are litigated.
It is possible that this may already be happening after Twombly and
Iqbal. The two decisions have inevitably caused some cases to be
dismissed and others not to be filed in the first place. Both developments
reduce the need for plaintiffs’ lawyers and defense lawyers. It may be that
the reduction in legal employment over recent years was due not only to
222. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
223. See supra Section II(D).
224. See generally sources cited supra note 206.
225. Hazard, supra note 221, at 1021-22.
226. See Marcus, supra note 19, at 187.
227. See id. at 193.
228. Id. (citing Mirjan R. Damaska, The Uncertain Fate of Evidentiary Transplants: AngloAmerican and Continental Experiments, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 839, 843 (1997)).
229. See generally Subrin, supra note 160.
230. See generally id.
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the general recession that the economy suffered. In addition, Twombly and
Iqbal may have contributed to the decline in employment for both
plaintiffs’ and defense lawyers by reducing both the number of cases that
are filed and the amount of discovery that is conducted.
The reduction in employment would be a good development. Some
of society’s smartest, hardest-working people would switch from lives
devoted to counterproductive, wasteful discovery to other productive,
helpful careers. That the legal profession in many other countries is
smaller helps, not harms, these countries.
IV. CONCLUSION
The provisions for broad discovery in the FRCP have failed since
they were adopted in 1938. The system began to fail from the beginning
and has continued to fail. It has dramatically increased litigation’s cost
and pain, with few balancing benefits.
Broad discovery should be eliminated, returning the United States to
the sensible approach of the rest of the world. The Supreme Court’s
decisions in Twombly and Iqbal correctly focus on the dangers of
discovery abuse and they appropriately require dismissal of some cases
that would otherwise become fishing expeditions. 231 The 2015 FRCP
amendments are ineffectual tinkering. Reform beyond this is needed.
Broad discovery should be completely eliminated.

231. See generally Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662 (2009).
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